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Abstract
Compared to other types of social networks, criminal networks present particularly hard
challenges, due to their strong resilience to disruption, which poses severe hurdles to Law-
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). Herein, we borrow methods and tools from Social Network
Analysis (SNA) to (i) unveil the structure and organization of Sicilian Mafia gangs, based on
two real-world datasets, and (ii) gain insights as to how to efficiently reduce the Largest Con-
nected Component (LCC) of two networks derived from them. Mafia networks have peculiar
features in terms of the links distribution and strength, which makes them very different from
other social networks, and extremely robust to exogenous perturbations. Analysts also face
difficulties in collecting reliable datasets that accurately describe the gangs’ internal struc-
ture and their relationships with the external world, which is why earlier studies are largely
qualitative, elusive and incomplete. An added value of our work is the generation of two real-
world datasets, based on raw data extracted from juridical acts, relating to a Mafia organiza-
tion that operated in Sicily during the first decade of 2000s. We created two different net-
works, capturing phone calls and physical meetings, respectively. Our analysis simulated
different intervention procedures: (i) arresting one criminal at a time (sequential node
removal); and (ii) police raids (node block removal). In both the sequential, and the node
block removal intervention procedures, the Betweenness centrality was the most effective
strategy in prioritizing the nodes to be removed. For instance, when targeting the top 5%
nodes with the largest Betweenness centrality, our simulations suggest a reduction of up to
70% in the size of the LCC. We also identified that, due the peculiar type of interactions in
criminal networks (namely, the distribution of the interactions’ frequency), no significant dif-
ferences exist between weighted and unweighted network analysis. Our work has significant
practical applications for perturbing the operations of criminal and terrorist networks.
PLOS ONE
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236476 August 5, 2020 1 / 22
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
a1111111111
OPEN ACCESS
Citation: Cavallaro L, Ficara A, De Meo P, Fiumara
G, Catanese S, Bagdasar O, et al. (2020) Disrupting
resilient criminal networks through data analysis:
The case of Sicilian Mafia. PLoS ONE 15(8):
e0236476. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0236476
Editor: Leto Peel, Universite Catholique de Louvain,
BELGIUM
Received: February 28, 2020
Accepted: July 6, 2020
Published: August 5, 2020
Copyright: © 2020 Cavallaro et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All datasets and code
source files are available from the Github database
at the following url: https://github.com/lcucav/
criminal-nets/tree/master/disruption.
Funding: The author(s) received no specific
funding for this work.
Competing interests: The authors have declared
that no competing interests exist.
Introduction
The Sicilian Mafia, known as Cosa Nostra, is a specific type of criminal organization. It began
in Sicily and then grew into a major international criminal organization [1–3], taking control
and influencing economic, social and political sectors of entire countries. Compared to other
criminal organizations, Mafia has a unique structure: it appears as a collection of loosely cou-
pled groups, which last for several generations [3, 4]. Each of these groups can be referred to as
cosca (i.e., a Sicilian word which refers to any plant whose spiny closely folded leaves symbolize
the tightness of relationships between members of the Mafia), gang, clan or family. Members
of a Mafia gang are tied by strong links, thus making the organization efficient and capable of
swiftly re-organizing itself to pursue the most profitable activities and adjust to law enforce-
ment operations. In fact, Mafia tends to create deep roots into the very fabric of society, to the
point that it becomes “impossible to destroy without a radical change in social institutions” (in
the words of Italian politician Leopoldo Franchetti, 1876 [1]).
An impressive scientific interest for the study of social structure of Sicilian Mafia syndicates
has been generated because of the social embeddedness of this type of criminal organization
[5, 6]. Herein, we borrow methods and tools from Social Network Analysis (SNA) to (i) unveil
the structure and organization of Sicilian Mafia gangs, based on two real-world datasets, and
(ii) gain insights as to how to reduce the size of the Largest Connected Component (LCC) of
two real Sicilian Mafia networks.
In graph theory, the LCC is a way to measure the network’s connectivity. Its size defines
how many people a single individual (i.e., a node) is able to reach through its relationship
bonds (i.e., direct links/edges or paths). Indeed, if the LCC size has the same order of magni-
tude of the network size, then the connectivity is at its maximum. On the other hand, nodes
removal (jointly with their links) may provoke the emerging of smaller clusters (or even iso-
lated nodes). As a consequence, a LCC size drop implies that the network becomes less and
less connected. Thus, the LCC size allows to quantify the effectiveness of the nodes removal
strategies.
SNA is typically employed by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) to analyze criminal net-
works, investigate the relations among criminals, and evaluate the effectiveness of law enforce-
ment interventions aimed at disrupting criminal networks [7]. Morselli [8] studied the
connections within the Gambino, New York based family, and he focused on the career of
Saul Gravano, a member of the Gambino family. McGloin [2] made an analysis on the struc-
ture of a network based on the street gangs in Newark, New Jersey. Calderoni [9] explained
how illicit drug traffics were indirectly handled by high-status Mafia members, whereas the
most central and visible positions were held by middle-level criminals.
On the other hand, when seeking optimal disruptive strategies for criminal networks, two
main approaches can be considered [10]: the human capital and the social capital. The former
originates from economics, and refers to the personal attributes and/or resources possessed by
actors within a social network. Sparrow [11] suggested that identifying the individuals who
possess many resources and skills offers a great opportunity to damage the criminal network.
Cornish [12] introduced the notion of script, which is borrowed from cognitive science. A
script approach is a way to better understand how crimes are committed and how to prevent
them. The central element of this approach, the crime script, is a step-by-step account of the
actions and decisions involved in a crime. If the script is correctly identified, it can be used to
prevent or disrupt crime commission. Later on, Bruinsma and Bernasco [13] combined this
script concept with SNA, to identify the role of human capital within criminal networks.
By contrast, the social capital network-disruption strategy [14, 15] refers to the connections
or ties between the actors in a network. It is through these connections that actors can have
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strategic positions, exchanging and sharing resources with other actors in the network [10, 11,
16–18]. Research in this field is often based on SNA to find the most influential or powerful
individuals of social capital, who correspond to the most central nodes in a network [19].
There is empirical evidence that brokers (i.e., the individuals acting as bridges between discon-
nected subgroups) have a key role in the connectivity of criminal networks, often relating sepa-
rate criminal collectives within illegal markets [20, 17, 21–26]. For instance, the impact of
brokers on the crime commission processes has been investigated by Morselli and Roy [20].
Through SNA, a number of interesting findings have been made over the years. Agreste
et al. [26] devised an efficient approch for dismantling mafia syndicates, based on the applica-
tion of percolation theory. Peterson [27] argued that the most central actors in covert networks
might also be the most visible, and for this reason the most likely to be detected. Spapens [28]
identified a brokerage role within Dutch ecstasy production, observing that brokers not only
increase “social capital” within these criminal collectives, but also add “human capital”. Bright
et al. [29] investigated the effectiveness of five law enforcement interventions in disrupting
and dismantling criminal networks, using both the social, and human capital approaches.
Moreover, they showed how the removal of actors based on the Betweenness centrality metric
was the most efficient strategy.
In this paper we focus particularly on one aspect of network resilience, that is the ability of
criminal networks to survive the actions of the LEAs. However, network resilience also relates
to the capacity of these networks to reorganize after perturbations (e.g., police raids), and to
reestablish connectivity. This latter aspect has not been investigated herein because our net-
works are currently treated as a static dataset. Nonetheless, this work is a significantly extended
version of the early proof-of-concept results published in our recent conference paper [30].
Several authors [31, 32] have described the concept of network resilience considering two
main aspects: (i) the capacity to absorb and thus resist disruption, (ii) the capacity to modify
the network’s internal structure and strategies, in order to adapt to external pressures. Resil-
ience depends on the level of redundancy present in the criminal network. Redundancy is
reflected in the number of relationships among the network actors, and is associated with
strong connections between these actors [33]. A high level of redundancy and consequently of
diversity of relationships in the network allows it to function even if some tie is broken and to
find more options to substitute the network actors who have been arrested, incarcerated, or
killed by LEAs. Replacements are often found within short social distances because criminal
connections often start from already established social networks of kinship, friendship, or
emotional ties [5, 34].
We have mentioned that the Sicilian Mafia differs from other criminal organizations. Mafia
networks have peculiar features, due to the links distribution and strength, which makes them
extremely robust to exogenous perturbations. Analysts are also faced with the difficulty in col-
lecting reliable datasets that accurately describe the gangs’ internal structure and their relation-
ships with the external world, which is why earlier studies are largely qualitative, elusive and
incomplete. A key feature of our work is the generation of two real-world datasets, which we
have anonymized (to eliminate sensitive data) and made publicly available online on GitHub
repository (https://github.com/lcucav/criminal-nets/tree/master/disruption) and on Zenodo
(https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3938818). These are based on raw data derived from juridical
acts, relating to a Mafia gang that operated in Sicily (Italy) during the first decade of 2000s. We
have chosen the court order associated with the “Montagna” operation because it contained
the largest number of wiretaps and stakeout among all court orders we could manage. Conse-
quently, we were able to set up a much larger dataset than what we could have obtained by
focusing on other court orders. We created two very different networks, capturing phone calls
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and physical meetings, respectively, which we have characterized in our recent conference
paper [35].
Our datasets relate to a Mafia syndicate acting as a link between prominent criminal fami-
lies, operating in the two biggest cities (Palermo and Catania) of Southern Italy. The Phone
Calls dataset has been derived from eavesdropping, while the Meetings dataset has been
derived from police surveillance data. Both datasets are represented by undirected networks.
For each of them we have created a weighted graph version (considering the frequency of
interactions between individuals, or nodes), as well as an unweighted version (accounting only
for connections).
The present study goes well beyond the initial characterization of these datasets [35], inves-
tigating network robustness across different scenarios, pinpointing the most effective metric,
and demonstrating an effective strategy to obtain a faster LCC size drop. We simulate two
types of police operations: (i) arresting one criminal at a time (sequential node removal), and
(ii) police raids (node block removal). We evaluate how the different types of networks are
impacted by these two types of perturbations, in terms of LCC size drop.
Generally, the resilience of a network is the result of several factors deriving from the net-
work structure, such as the position of the nodes (i.e., the social capital), and individual techni-
cal abilities (i.e., the human capital). The former refers to the most connected actors (i.e., key
players) of a criminal network and/or the nodes connecting the several groups and subgroups
inside a network (i.e., bridges). The latter refers to the precious knowledge, skills and technical
abilities of a criminal network node (e.g., pharmacological and chemical knowledge are
required in drug synthesis processes). Villani et al. [36] tried to check whether, and to which
extent, strategies based on both human and social capital could reduce (or neutralize) resis-
tance and adaptation abilities of criminal organizations. Thus, we base our attack strategy on
the social capital approach. We employ SNA methods to identify the actors having a high level
of social capital. These are typically the most influential individuals, with a central role in the
criminal network. To this end, we put to test four different centrality metrics, namely: (i)
Degree centrality, (ii) Betweenness centrality, (iii) Katz centrality, and (iv) Collective Influence.
It is worth recalling from SNA that the Degree centrality helps identifying network hubs (i.e.,
the focal points). However, contrary to other types of networks, criminal networks communi-
cations are not necessarily mediated via hubs, which are more visible and, thus, more vulnera-
ble [21, 27]. On the other hand, by weighing the communication paths (rather than nodes in
isolation), Betweeness centrality pinpoints those nodes that play an important role in multiple
communication paths. We have therefore hypothesized that Betweeness centrality could help
removing the individuals that are crucial in maintaining the information network. In turn,
removing those individuals would increase the LCC size drop inside the networks, which is
our aim.
For the sake of completeness, we also considered two more prominent centrality metrics.
Katz centrality computes the relative influence of a node, measuring the number of node’s
immediate neighbours (first degree nodes) and also all the other nodes in the network that
connect to the node itself through these immediate neighbours. Finally, Collective Influence
establishes the centrality of a node in a criminal network taking into account the degree of the
node’s neighbours at a given distance l from it.
Our analysis identifies Betweenness centrality as the most effective metric, showing how, by
neutralizing only 5% of the affiliates, the LCC size dropped by 70%. We also identified that,
due the peculiar type of interactions in criminal networks (namely, the distribution of the
interactions frequency) no significant differences exist between weighted and unweighted net-
work analysis. Our work has significant practical applications for tackling criminal and terror-
ist networks.
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Materials and methods
Background
In this paper we consider two weighted and undirected criminal networks or graphs. For con-
venience, we first summarise some key concepts of network theory [37] and formalize the
problem at hand.
An unweighted graph G = (V, E) consists of a finite set V of n vertices (also called nodes or
actors), and a set E� V × V of edges (also called links or ties).
A weighted graph is defined as a triplet G = (V, E, W), consisting of a finite set of vertices V,
a set of edges E� V × V between nodes, and a set of positive weights W: E! R++ defined on
each edge.
When all the edges are bidirectional, the graph is called undirected.
A path from node u to v is a sequence of nodes starting with u and ending with v, such that
between any consecutive nodes there is a link. The path cost is the sum of the weights of all
links along the path. A shortest path from u to v is a path along which the path cost is minimal
(there may exist multiple shortest paths). In weighted graphs, the path cost equals is sum of the
weights along the path. For unweighted graphs, a shortest path is that (or those) consisting of
the fewest number of links.
A connected component [38] of an undirected graph is a subgraph in which any two vertices
are connected to each other by paths, and which is connected to no additional vertices outside
of this component (i.e., the connected components represent a partition of the whole graph,
sometimes called supergraph). The LCC is the biggest one among all the connected compo-
nents in a graph.
The adjacency matrix of a graph G defined over the set of vertices V = {1, . . ., n}, is an n × n
square matrix denoted by A = (aij), 1� i, j� n, where aij = 1 if there exists an edge joining ver-
tices i and j, and aij = 0 otherwise. Moreover, if the element (i, j) of the matrix Ak (k� 2) is
one, then the nodes i and j are connected through some walk of length exactly k. The weighted
networks can be represented by giving the elements of the adjacency matrix values equal to the
weights of the corresponding connections.
Centrality is a key concept in network analysis, and refers to the importance of a node in a
network. There are multiple measures for network centrality in use within SNA, but the two
most common centrality measures relating to strategic positions are Degree centrality and
Betweenness centrality [11, 16].
Degree centrality [39] is a measure which evaluates the local importance of a node within
the graph; given a node i, the Degree centrality CD(i) of i is defined by:
CDðiÞ ¼
X
j2V;j6¼i
aij; ð1Þ
where A = (aij) is the adjacency matrix of the graph.
The node degree represents the number of edges adjacent to the node, while the weighted
node degree is the sum of the edge weights, for edges incident to that node. This measure has
been formalized as follows [40]:
CWD ðiÞ ¼
X
j2V;ði;jÞ2E
wij; ð2Þ
where w is the weighted adjacency matrix, in which wij is greater than 0 if the node i is con-
nected to node j, and the value represents the weight of the edge.
Some nodes may play a particularly important role in propagating information because
they act as bridges between separate regions of a graph and so they have the potential to slow
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down (or magnify) the information flow from one region to another. Such nodes are said to
have a high value of Betweenness centrality [41]. Specifically, the (shortest-path) betweenness
CB(i) of a node i is defined as follows:
CBðiÞ ¼
X
s;t2V;s6¼t
sðs; t j iÞ
sðs; tÞ
; ð3Þ
where σ(s, t) is the number of shortest paths between an arbitrary pair of nodes s and t, while σ
(s, t j i) denotes those shortest paths passing through the node i.
Betweenness centrality is a measure based on shortest paths for both unweighted and
weighted networks. For our algorithm, we use Breadth-First Search (BFS) for unweighted and
Dijkstra’s algorithm for weighted graphs.
Katz centrality [42] is another centrality measure, which defines the centrality for a node
based on the centrality of its neighbours. For a node i this is defined as:
CKðiÞ ¼ a
X
j2V
aijCKðjÞ þ b; ð4Þ
where α and β are positive constants, A = (aij) is the adjacency matrix of the graph, whose
eigenvalues are denoted by λi, i = 1, . . ., n. The parameter β controls the initial centrality, while
the parameter α satisfies the inequality:
a <
1
maxfli : 1 � i � ng
:
The Katz centrality for weighted networks can be computed in a similar way, but in this
case we have to use the weighted adjacency matrix instead.
Another useful network metric is the Collective Influence (CI) [43], which computes the
centrality (or influence) of a node i of a network according to the formula:
CI‘ðiÞ ¼ ðki   1Þ
X
j2dBði;‘Þ
ðkj   1Þ; ð5Þ
where ki is the degree of node i, B(i, ℓ) is the ball of radius ℓ centered on node i, and δB(i, ℓ) is
the frontier of the ball, that is, the set of nodes at distance ℓ from i (the distance between two
nodes is defined as the number of edges of the shortest path connecting them). To compute
CIx2113;(i), we first find the nodes on the frontier δB(i, ℓ). To compute the CI in a weighted net-
work, we have to substitute the degree k of a node by his weighted degree given by formula (2).
Clustering Coefficient (CC) is a measure of the degree to which nodes in a graph tend to
cluster together. For unweighted graphs, the clustering of a node i, denoted by CC(i), is the
fraction of possible triangles through that node that exist, given by
CCðiÞ ¼
2TðiÞ
kiðki   1Þ
; ð6Þ
where T(i) is the number of triangles through node i and ki is the degree of i. For weighted
graphs, the clustering is defined as the geometric average of the subgraph edge weights [44],
obtained from the formula
CCðiÞ ¼
1
kiðki   1Þ
X
i;j2V
ðw^ijw^iww^jwÞ
1=3
; ð7Þ
PLOS ONE Disrupting resilient criminal networks through data analysis
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236476 August 5, 2020 6 / 22
where w^ij are the edge weights normalized by the maximum weight in the network
w^ij ¼ wij=maxðwÞ.
The Average Path Length (APL) [45] is a useful metric for assessing the connectivity of a
graph. It is the average number of steps along the shortest paths for all possible pairs of net-
work nodes. The average path length is defined as follows:
APL ¼
X
i;j2V
dði; jÞ
nðn   1Þ ð8Þ
where V = {1, . . ., n} is the set of nodes in the graph G, d(i, j) is the length of the shortest path
from node i to node j, and n is the number of nodes in G.
Dataset collection
In this section we describe how the datasets have been collected. Our datasets were derived
from the pre-trial detention order, issued by the Court of Messina’s preliminary investigation
judge on March 14, 2007, which was towards the end of the major anti-mafia operation
referred to as the “Montagna Operation”.
We have chosen the court order associated with the operation Montagna because it con-
tained the largest number of wiretaps and stakeout instances among all court orders we had
access to, which allowed us to maximise the size of the dataset.
This operation was concluded in 2007 by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Messina (Sicily)
and was conducted by the Special Operations Unit of the Italian Police (Reparto Operativo Spe-
ciale (R.O.S.) of the Carabinieri, specialized in anti-Mafia investigations).
This particular investigation was a prominent operation focused on two Mafia clans,
known as the “Mistretta” family and the “Batanesi” clan. From 2003 to 2007, these families
were found to had infiltrated several economic activities including major infrastructure works,
through a cartel of entrepreneurs close to the Sicilian Mafia.
According to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, the pre-trial detention order begins
with the crimes alleged against individuals. The same individual can be mentioned multiple
times in the order: for example, an individual A could appear for the first time because she/he
is accused of theft; furthermore, A could appear together with an individual B because both A
and B could be jointly accused of extortion.
Information available in the pre-trial detention order is relevant to the construction of a
graph, which falls within the class of the so-called of co-offending networks [46]: in a co-offend-
ing network, nodes are associated with individuals while edges specify that two individuals
(corresponding to the endpoints of that edge) co-participated in perpetrating a crime. The
construction of a co-offending network highly depends on the assessments of the public prose-
cutor, who could classify some activities as criminal ones, while considering other activities as
not criminally relevant.
In the light of these reasons, we preferred to focus on graphs that store meetings and phone
calls between individuals: these graphs, in fact, are built starting from the observation of indi-
vidual behaviors and, thus, they do not rely on the legal value that these behaviors could have
according to the personal view of the public prosecutor.
The pre-trial detention order reported the composition of both the Mistretta family and the
Batanesi clan; judicial proceedings followed a chronological narrative scheme which detailed
the illicit activities pursued by the members of the Mistretta clan before the imprisonement of
a boss; to preserve anonymity, we will denote such a boss as x. The boss x has been selected by
the most influential Mafia syndicates to settle the conflicts between the Mistretta and the
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Batanesi families. The conflicts were unleashed from the extortion imposed on local entrepre-
neurs in the construction of the highway that connects the city of Messina to Palermo.
LEAs relied on the depositions of collaborators of justice, stakeouts and wiretapping.
Meetings involving suspected individuals can be broadly classified as follows: (a) meetings
which aim to define the organizational structure of the Mafia syndicate along with its relation-
ships with entrepreneurs and other Mafia syndicates operating in surrounding areas. The boss
x always attended these meetings and has always been accompanied by at least two trusted
men. (b) Meetings involving people who occupied the lowest levels of the Mafia syndicate hier-
archy; the purpose of these meetings was, in general, to design illicit activities and, usually,
only two people were involved in these meetings. For each one the date of the meeting, the
place, and the participants were recorded. Participants to a meeting were identified by a
unique identification code. The procedure to build the Meetings network was as follows: (a)
each person who participated in at least one meeting corresponds to a node in the network; (b)
two subjects in the Meetings network are connected by an edge if both of them attended at
least one meeting; (c) edge weights reflect the number of meetings that two individuals jointly
attended. Analogously, judicial proceedings recorded phone calls between the individuals
under investigation. For each call, the ID of the caller (resp., the ID of the receiver), the time of
the call, the duration, and content of the conversation were reported. The procedure to build
the Phone Calls network was as follows: (a) each person who made or received at least one call
was associated with a node in the network; (b) two nodes in the phone call are connected by an
edge if the associated individuals had at least one call; (c) the weight attached to an edge speci-
fies the number of phone calls between the individuals connected by that edge. Observe that
we used only text data (from pre-trial detention order) to derive links in both the Meetings
and the Phone Calls networks. In addition, we included all actors found in the investigation
records, independently of the fact that an actor is actually a member of a Mafia syndicate or
not.
Dataset description
In this section we explain how we have created the datasets (which is fully available on GitHub
repository https://github.com/lcucav/criminal-nets/tree/master/disruption) and on Zenodo
(https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3938818), generating two criminal networks, directly from
Court data. We have previously reported a visual representation of both datasets as undirected
and weighted graphs in [35]. In our datasets, each node represents an individual, whereas links
show mutual interactions among the individuals. The Meetings dataset, captures the physical
meetings among suspects. the Phone Calls dataset refers to phone calls among individuals.
In [35], we introduced a preliminary characterization, whereby we defined the weight dis-
tributions and conducted the shortest path length analysis. The weights distribution analysis
unveiled a long tail of nodes, with just a few dominating ones. We could observe that a pre-
dominant number of links had similar weight (w = 1), thus making the distinction between
weighted and unweighted graphs negligible after the removal of the better connected nodes.
As also confirmed through the shortest path length analysis, the study demonstrated that just a
few affiliates tend to be responsible for the highest interaction frequency with a balanced num-
ber of intermediates. This is because the clans aim to avoid an overexposure of the bosses (and
other prominent affiliates), to minimize police interceptions.
Encouraged by those early results, in the present paper we have moved our attention to
understand how LCC varies as a result of police interventions (i.e., the nodes removal
process).
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The key features of our datasets are summarized in Table 1, including the number of nodes
and edges, the maximum weight, the maximum frequency in the affiliates’ interactions, the
average degree (neighbours per node), and the highest number of individuals required to con-
nect mobsters (based on all shortest paths in both datasets). We also calculated the APL and
the CC of the Meetings and the Phone Calls networks. It is worth noticing that the two datasets
have 47 nodes in common and a comment on this overlap is extensively discussed in Subsect.
Main limiting factors of our study.
Indeed, both networks can be treated as either unweighted and weighted networks since,
for each pair of individuals, we recorded a coefficient representing the number of times the
pair had a meeting (as reported by the police surveillance logs), and made a phone call
(reported in police interceptions logs). In SNA terms, these coefficients are known as the
strength of the connection between two individuals.
Nodes may belong to different categories. Some nodes represent the leaders (i.e., “bosses”)
or the soldiers (i.e., “picciotti”, a Sicilian word which refers to the lowest rank of the Mafia hier-
archy) of the criminal organization. Other nodes are associated with individuals (e.g., a fruit
seller or a baker) who had one or more calls with members of a Mafia syndicate but are not
affiliated with any criminal organization.
The APL and CC values in the Meetings network were then compared with the average val-
ues of APL and CC of a random graph G?; in our tests, G? had the same number of nodes and
the same average degree of the Meetings network. In the Meetings network, the APL and CC
are equal to 3.308 and 0.656, respectively; in the random graph associated with the Meetings
network, we measured an APL and a CC equal to 4.342 and 0.0018, respectively.
We repeated the procedure above for the Phone Call graph and, thus, we generated a ran-
dom graph with the same number of nodes of the same average degree of the Phone Call graph
and we calculated its APL and CC. We observe that the APL and the CC for the Phone Calls
network are equal to 3.378 and 0.105, respectively; in the random graph associated with the
Phone Calls network, we measured an APL equal to 5.593 and a CC equal to 0.0039. We can
therefore conclude that both in the Meetings and Phone Calls networks the CC values are con-
siderably bigger than those found in the corresponding random graph; in contrast, APL values
are moderately lower than those found in the corresponding random graph.
In the light of our analysis, both the Meetings and the Phone Calls networks can be
regarded as small world networks [47]. The high CC coupled with a low average path length
favour the information flow among the individuals in the criminal organization and promote
their coordination, thus making the organization more effective.
Table 1. Characteristics of meetings and phone calls networks.
Parameter Meetings Phone Calls
No. Nodes 101 100
No. Edges 256 124
Max. Weight 10 8
Max. Frequency 200 100
Avg. Degree 5.07 2.48
Diameter 7 14
APL 3.308 3.378
CC 0.656 0.105
Common nodes 47
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236476.t001
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Experimental method
This section briefly describes the experimental process employed to disrupt the two networks
and evaluate the effects of node removal, under different conditions and strategies. Both data-
sets were used, under both unweighted and weighted conditions. Two node removal strategies
have been studied. These are iterative procedures in which the nodes have been removed in
decreasing order of their centrality score. After the node removal stage, the LCC size is
updated and the process resumes.
Let us denote by LCC(G) the size of the LCC of a graph G. Denote by Gi the graph resulting
after the i-th iteration of the node removal algorithm, whose size of the LCC is LCC(Gi).
Clearly, the unperturbed graph is G0, for which we have LCC(G0).
The relative difference between the size of the LCC at the start of the simulation and after
the i-th iteration (i.e., i-th node removal) is given by ρi 2 [0, 1]:
ri ¼ 1   j
LCCðGiÞ   LCCðG0Þ
LCCðG0Þ
j ð9Þ
Note that ρ0 = 1 and ρn = 0, where n is the last iteration (sequential removal).
Both strategies (sequential and block removal) may be summarized as follows:
1. We first compute LCC(G0), i.e., the LCC size for the initial graph G0.
2. This step depends on the removal strategy. Either the the highest ranking of the remaining
nodes (in the sequential strategy), or the the set of the five most influential nodes of the
remaining ones (in the block strategy) are removed. Ranks are computed with the current
centrality score. The new graph Gi, with i = 1, 2, . . ., n is obtained (for block removal we
have fewer iterations).
3. Compute LCC(Gi), and calculate ρi.
4. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until the graph size can no longer be reduced.
Sequential nodes removal. It simulates the scenario in which affiliates are arrested one-
by-one by the police.
Block nodes removal. It simulates the scenario in which affiliates are arrested during a
raid by the police. This strategy is similar to the sequential one, with the main difference being
that nodes are removed in blocks of five. The block size depends on the type and scale of the
datasets. The fraction of nodes to be removed during block police operations is a reasonable
value that takes into account some considerations. In an our previous study [26] in which we
obtained a serious reduction of the LCC with only 5% as block size (See Comparison to our
earlier works). Moreover, in such a relatively small criminal network larger fractions of block
sizes appear unrealistic. This is why, in our case, five has been found to be adequate in terms of
number of nodes removed at once.
Comparison to our earlier works
It is worth highlighting the most significant contributions of the present paper, compared the
preliminary data published earlier on [26]. The main differences are as follows:
1. In [26], we introduced a different set of datasets. The first one depicted phone calls among
suspected criminals. This was then refined through a different investigative method, i.e., the
stakeout, which refers to searching private residences and personal bank information
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according to a formal search warrant. In this way, we were able to build a second dataset
that included crime relationships among mobsters. This second dataset may be considered
to be a subset of the first one, including only actual criminals, as classified by the LEAs
based on criminal evidence.
By contrast, the datasets introduced herein have been derived from different investigation
methods, namely wiretapping and stakeouts. This comes with the benefit of having two
datasets that are only loosely related. In fact, only a fraction of wiretapped individuals also
attended face-to-face meetings with other suspects (and vice versa).
The output of wiretapping and stakeout activities generated two graphs (the Meetings and
the Phone Calls networks) with different topological features and with a smaller than
expected degree of overlap (i.e., the Meetings and the Phone Calls networks had 100 and
101 subjects respectively, of which only 47 were common to both). The structural analysis
of the Meetings and the Phone Calls networks is therefore relevant for identifying which
specific features of a Mafia syndicate are properly caught by wiretapping, but are over-
looked from stakeout (and vice versa). This kind of analysis was not possible in our previ-
ous contribution.
2. Beyond the introduction of new experimental datasets, the present paper has different
aims. While in [26], we aimed at disrupting the network (e.g., by enlarging the average path
length), herein we seek what may cause the largest drop in LCC size.
3. Unlike our previous work, herein we introduce weighted graphs to describe ties between
suspect individuals. Weights attached to graph edges measure the intensity of the tie
between two suspects and this information was useful to perform new studies (e.g., the
effects due to targeted attacks on weighted graphs), which were missing in [26].
4. In this paper we consider two more centrality measures, the Katz centrality and the Collec-
tive Influence, to identify the nodes which should be targeted. For example, the Katz cen-
trality uses the contribution of all paths converging to a node in order to calculate the
centrality of that node. Therefore, this provides a substantially different approach to com-
puting node centrality from that provided by Betwenneess and Closeness centrality
(exploited in our previous paper), which are based only on the shortest paths.
Results
In this section the results obtained from our experiments on LCC size are shown. The network
analysis is reported next, considering weighted and unweighted graphs scenarios.
Weighted graphs
Fig 1 shows the results obtained for the cases of sequential and block node removal, for both
datasets, and including all four centrality metrics. Remarkably, the Katz coefficient (tuned to
the default values of α = 0.1 and β = 1.0) is the least effective one (i.e, the slowest one) at caus-
ing the faster LCC size drop, in all eight cases, that are: two datsets (Meetings and Phone
Calls), two strategies (sequential and block) and two graph structures (weighted and
unweighted).
To understand this result intuitively, we need to look at the way this centrality metric oper-
ates. Katz determines the importance of each node based on the number of walks that pass
through it; but it does not consider their length. Furthermore, shortest path are not considered,
hence a walk may visit the same node multiple times. Yet, this is in contrast to how criminals
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would operate in practice. Affiliates typically prefer to spread the information through a num-
ber of intermediaries, to minimize the risk of interception by non-family members. This is
consistent with our earlier findings [35]. Ultimately, it would not make sense (and would be
unwise) to send the same message multiple times through the same path, which is what Katz
would help identifying. Therefore, removing nodes by the highest Katz score would not be a
winning strategy.
All the other metrics act better than Katz centrality, and comparably among each other.
This happens because of the weights distribution shape [35], which exhibits a long tail of
nodes, with just a few dominating ones (Sect. Dataset Description). Thus, after removing the
most central nodes (i.e., the first five iterations), the network gets almost totally disconnected
and the remaining nodes have the same weight (w = 1). Hence, all the metrics focused on
either degree (i.e., Degree and Collective Influence) or shortest paths (i.e., Betweenness) follow
Fig 1. Weighted networks. A: Meetings dataset, sequential node removal strategy. B: Meetings dataset, block node removal strategy. C: Phone Calls
dataset, sequential node removal strategy. D: Phone Calls dataset, block node removal strategy.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236476.g001
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the same ρ drop speed. On the other hand, Katz centrality with its default parameters focuses
on walks of undefined lengths, thus producing a slower ρ drop.
Sequential vs block removal
Looking at Fig 1, with the exception of Katz, no significant differences are visible between the
two node-removal strategies (i.e., sequential and block). This is somewhat counter-intuitive,
since in real life police raids are typically aimed at breaking up the network more effectively. In
our case, this result originates from the particular type of the datasets at hand. When con-
structing the datasets, we did not have access to information about the way criminals recon-
structed their communication channels following arrests. Hence, our network is static (i.e., it
misses the network reconfiguration data), which is why our analysis is not fully capturing the
dynamic aspects that differentiate sequential and block strategies. In network terms, this trans-
lates into no differences in terms of LCC size drop as the network is static. On the other hand,
significant network re-tuning of nodes importance, due to internal re-organisation of trusted
affiliates used to spread messages within and outside the criminal network, would be expected
in the case of dynamic graphs (i.e., graph snapshots before and after police operations).
Weighted vs Unweighted
Considering now the differences between weighted and unweighted graph analysis, we notice
that the majority of cases do not pinpoint major differences. This was due to the peculiar way
in which weights are distributed in criminal networks (as noted in the Weighted Graphs
paragraph).
Nevertheless, interesting differences are visible in the Meetings dataset—sequential node
removal (Fig 2). The unweighted case is mostly faster than (although occasionally equivalent
to) the weighted case. This is because the weights (i.e., the affiliates’ interaction frequency) are
concentrated in very few individuals, with most other weights having w = 1. This is also why,
with the exception of the initial transient period (involving very few interactions), most algo-
rithms converge to similar values.
Fig 2. First 30 iterations of the sequential node removal strategy, Meetings dataset. A: Unweighted Graph. B: Weighted Graph.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236476.g002
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The best centrality metric
Comparing the algorithms in Fig 2, it emerges that Betweeness centrality is by far the most
effective centrality index for reducing the size of the LCC of a criminal network.
This result is consistent with literature reports upon criminal networks’ SNA shown in the
Introduction, and has an intuitive explanation. Indeed, to avoid being intercepted, members
of a criminal networks build their relationships to assure that information flows along the
shortest possible paths. In this way, both the Meetings and the Phone Calls network configure
themselves as small-world networks with a low average path length and a large CC. The nodes
that intercept most of these shortest paths are those having the largest values of Betweenness
centrality, and act as intermediaries to assure the quick flow of information from any source to
any target in the graph.
To confirm this intuition, we progressively removed nodes according to their Betweenness
centrality and we measured the corresponding variation of APL and the number nc of con-
nected components (see Fig 3). These plots indicate that the selected removal of nodes ampli-
fies the average distance between any pair of nodes in the Meetings/Phone Calls networks and,
simultaneously, it creates an increasing number of disjoint components. A repressive action
aimed at removing high Betweenness nodes has, therefore, a devastating impact on network
topology because it causes an LCC size drop, as we observed a fast drop in ρ. Also, since the
Katz centrality prioritizes those nodes crossed by a large number of walks of arbitrary length, it
is less effective in detecting the nodes acting as intermediaries, and whose removal reduces the
LCC size the most.
Fig 3. Function variations of the number of removed nodes in the Meetings and phone calls networks. Nodes are
prioritized on the basis of their Betweenness centrality. A: Variation of the APL. B: Variation of the number of
connected components.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236476.g003
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Intuitively, Betweenness centrality outperforms the other metrics, thanks to its operation
on paths, rather than on individual nodes degree. This is particularly effective in criminal net-
works that are devised in such a way as to minimize the path length, in order to reduce the risk
of police interceptions. Betweeness centrality compromises the most influential paths, leading
to a faster drop in ρ. This feature is what makes Betweeness somehow opposite to Katz central-
ity (whose goal is to explore walks).
Collective Influence was the second worst performer after Katz. This is, again, due to its
emphasis on node degree instead of path length. Collective Influence is also showing some dif-
ferences between the weighted and the unweighted processes, exhibiting a lower ρ drop in the
weighed graph. A possible explanation is that the weighted case identifies as influential nodes
not only those with higher weights on the incident links, but also the nodes having high-weight
only on immediate neighbours. This could reflect a typical situation in criminal networks,
whereby the top-leaders avoid direct exposure and mediate all communications through a sin-
gle trusted individual (or very few of them). On the other hand, this particular aspect is not
detectable in the unweighted analysis.
Correlation between social capital and human capital
Inspired by the work of [36], we analyzed the correlation between the social capital and the
human capital in the criminal organization we are considering.
In Sociology, the social capital denotes a group of tangible and intangible resources such as
interpersonal relationships, a shared sense of identity, shared norms and values, trust, coopera-
tion, and reciprocity which are fundamental to assure the functioning of human communities.
From our experiments, individuals with high Betweennees contribute significantly to the social
capital associated with a criminal organization because they connect the various subgroups
composing the criminal organization itself and enable efficient information flow within the
organization.
Thereby, the removal of high Betweenness individuals induces a strong reduction in the
social capital but is not, however, the greatest loss that a criminal network might suffer from.
For instance, in a drug-trafficking organization, individuals with specialized knowledge in
chemistry play a pivotal role to carry out the illicit affairs of the organization. Thus, their
removal seriously affects the organization. even if those individuals had low Betweenness.
Broadly speaking, the human capital refers to the skills and resources that some compo-
nents of the organizations have and which play a key role in the functioning and long-term
sustainability of the organization. As noted in [36], the most effective repressive actions should
simultaneously aim at weakening both the social and human capital of a criminal organization.
To this purpose, Villani et al. [36] suggested a new index (called CNR—Criminal Network
Resilience) to assess the resilience of criminal networks, which combines parameters related to
social capital, as well as parameters associated with the human capital.
In our study, individuals have three different roles, namely leaders, members, and elements
close to the gang but not affiliated with it. Leaders contribute more significantly than others to
human capital because they are in charge of making decisions, planning and coordinating
criminal actions. In turn, the human capital associated with the members of the gang is greater
than those who are close but not affiliated with it. In Table 2 (resp. Table 3) we report the top
10 nodes of the Meetings (resp. Phone Calls) graphs, sorted by decreasing Betweenness values,
and their role in the organization. Observe that the node with ID 18 is associated with a leader
and has the highest Betweenness, both in the Meetings and in the Phone Calls networks.
In addition, many nodes (18, 27, 29, 36, 47, 68) have high centrality, in both the Meetings
and in the Phone Calls networks. We underline that both in the Meetings and in the Phone
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Calls networks there are only two leaders in the top 10 positions, which indicates that there is a
weak correlation between social and human capital, and this agrees well with the results of
[36].
Take-home message
In short, our results confirmed the effectiveness of SNA in speeding up the process of reducing
the LCC size of criminal networks. Considering our datasets, we could severely affect LCC
(with a 70% LCC size drop) by neutralizing less than 5% of the affiliates (either through
sequential arrests or police raids). Betweenness centrality performed significantly better than
the other three metrics, thanks to its specific focus on paths, rather than simple node degree.
This is consistent with the typical operation of criminal networks where information diffuses
through the shortest paths and within the organization, to minimize intra-affiliates interac-
tions and, thus, the risk of interception. Therefore, law enforcement interventions should
favor path-related centrality metrics (such as Betweenness) instead of other strategies.
Discussion
Our social capital investigation shows that Betweenness centrality is the most relevant central-
ity metric, as it causes an effective LCC fragmentation for both networks under scrutiny.
Indeed, Betweenness is the only metric (out of the four analysed) that focuses on shortest
paths, which reflects the structure of Mafia syndicates. The LCC size drop velocity depends on
Table 3. Betweenness centrality value and role (Phone Calls network).
Position Node ID Betweenness centrality Role
1 18 0.418 Leader
2 61 0.282 Member
3 47 0.236 Member
4 29 0.22 Member
5 75 0.096 Member
6 36 0.085 Member
7 27 0.083 Leader
8 68 0.068 Member
9 58 0.06 close
10 70 0.051 close
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236476.t003
Table 2. Betweenness centrality values and role (Meetings network).
Position Node ID Betweenness centrality Role
1 18 0.373 Leader
2 47 0.22 Member
3 27 0.159 Leader
4 68 0.126 Member
5 12 0.117 Member
6 25 0.114 Leader
7 29 0.09 Member
8 36 0.072 Member
9 22 0.069 Member
10 11 0.063 Member
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0236476.t002
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the capability of centrality metrics to target the appropriate node with the right criterium, in
terms of node importance, for the specific network topology. Mafia syndicates topologies are
based on trusted affiliates to spread messages (i.e., interact on shortest paths). Thus, it became
clear that centrality metrics based on shortest paths led to faster LCC size drops.
Interfering on the paths produces a sensitive LCC size drop among trusted affiliates. The
same conclusion has been drawn regardless of weights (to reflect interaction frequencies).
Overall, we could substantially and more rapidly reduce the LCC size by removing the top
5% most influential nodes, computed according to Betweenness score.
This effect is achieved thanks to the network weights distribution (or rather, their concen-
tration within few influential nodes), which leads to a rapid drop in ρ. Once the most influen-
tial nodes have been removed, the remaining ones are largely characterized by w = 1, which
makes the weighted and unweighted networks virtually indistinguishable.
Our SNA results can be directly translated onto law enforcement actions, considering that
we are now able to efficiently identify the top 5% most trusted affiliates (i.e., the ones typically
employed as intermediaries between bosses and the other members).
In turn, we can virtually neutralize the clans’ internal communication infrastructure by get-
ting the trusted affiliates in custody. Intuitively, whenever arrests can be made in block (raids),
that would further impair the ability of the criminal communication network to be re-estab-
lished. However, we have not studied this specific aspect, due to unavailability of necessary
data.
The pre-trial detention order is the final outcome of a time-consuming police investigation.
Once the inquiry is underway (and even before it has been completed), the actual network is
richer than the one derived from the pre-trial detention order. The investigative network
includes extra interactions among suspects, which are removed once the judge deems them to
be irrelevant. Thus, the final network derived from the original one is partial and misses the
data included in the initial investigation. This explains our limits related to the lack of data.
Furthermore, when LEAs inspect on those kinds of criminal networks, most of the time
they have prior knowledge thanks to criminal records, even though they may not have a clear
picture of the connections between individuals.
Generally speaking, the aim of a “cosca” is to conduct illegal activities (which may vary
from place to place and are susceptible to local trends), and to ultimately pursue effective
financial benefits. For instance, some clans may focus on drugs, rather than organ trafficking,
prostitution, finance, or political influence. Quite commonly, clans pursue multiple activities,
which makes it even more difficult to reconstruct the labyrinth of criminal communication
networks (and perform SNA thereof).
Our datasets emerged directly from a collection of official juridical acts, and focused on a
single criminal activity (the securement of public procurement contracts). This involved a net-
work of entrepreneurs, was confined to a specific geographical area, and captured information
over a limited time span. The peculiarity of our networks is that the gang was established in
relation to a specific event (procurement of a methanisation process), so it was not a pre-exis-
tent organisation. Thus, our dataset captured a relatively simpler snapshot of the complex
entanglement of mafia criminals, which constitutes both a strength, and weakness of our
study.
Indeed, if LEAs have prior knowledge, then our approach is even more efficient; otherwise,
as is the specific network herein considered, two main issues may arise to conduct investiga-
tions: (a) noise, and (b) different organisational time scales. By noise, we mean that LEAs could
have too much information (e.g., too many interceptions or surveillance logs, some of which
are worthless). By different organisational time scales we indicate that criminals already know
how to contact a specific criminal for their illicit purposes (e.g., a sniper), in a way LEAs might
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not be able to identify. Thus, they have to spend more time to reconstruct the inner relation-
ships by exploring the evidences and, as previously asserted, this is a time consuming process.
On the one hand, the scope of our SNA is limited by the significance and breadth of the
datasets at hand. We have mentioned already how a more dynamic analysis of the network
could not be done in this case, as for instance, understanding the re-connection ability follow-
ing events like individual arrests or police raids. Also, we are capturing a single criminal activ-
ity in a confined spatio-temporal context. So, it was not possible to detect a broader and more
diversified set of communications, such as those taking place in a more complex, multi-activity
network. Nor could we detect external communications, such as those involving people who
were not directly members of the criminal nets except for entrepreneurs (e.g., politicians, mag-
istrates and businessmen).
On the other hand, the greater specificity of our networks allowed a cleaner analysis,
focused on unveiling some hidden communication mechanisms. Having reduced the parame-
ters under scrutiny and the complexity of the system, we could pinpoint a simple, yet effective
strategy for unsettling the connectivity of the network through a dramatic drop in the LCC
size. This might have not emerged from the analysis of a more complex network. Also, this
simpler framework has allowed us to swiftly test out our hypothesis and to obtain reliable
results.
This could have been a challenge on a complex network, especially when multiple criminal
activities take place in parallel.
Main limiting factors of our study
We conclude this section by describing the main factors that posed some limits to our study.
1. Wiretapping is allowed strictly under well-motivated circumstances and for short periods of
time, thus limiting the ability of police forces to gather data on Mafia activities. According to
the Italian Code of Criminal Law, LEAs should request the Public Prosecutor an authoriza-
tion to wiretap conversations, also by means of electronic systems if such an activity is
indispensable to prevent crimes. If authorized, LEAs are allowed to wiretap individuals for
at most 40 days, which may be extended by up to 20 days. If the Public Prosecutor grants an
extension to wiretapping (and, in general, to other surveillance activities), she/he has to pro-
duce a written report in which the reasons justifying the prolongation of surveillance activi-
ties must be clearly explained. Therefore, LEAs have a limited ability of collecting the data
they need to reconstruct the topology of a criminal network and all information produced
during non-authorized periods are lost.
2. Collaborators of justice are often the main source of information for the investigators; yet they
cannot always be deemed to be reliable. Italian LEAs make an extensive use of the deposi-
tions of collaborators of justice, i.e., criminals who abandoned a Mafia syndicate and
decided to cooperate with criminal justice authorities in order to reveal the composition
and organizational structure of a Mafia syindicate. Collaborators of justice are widely con-
sidered as a powerful tool in dismantling Mafia syndicates, but their credibility must be
carefully checked. In the Montagna operation, there was a collaborator of justice who pro-
vided very accurate and detailed information in the early stages of the investigation tasks.
Nevertheless, from a certain point onward, that collaborator was no longer considered to be
credible and the information he provided was deemed as unreliable.
3. Mafia leaders avoid using phones to communicate. Investigations show that the affiliates of a
Mafia syndicate are highly suspicious of being tailed by police and, thus, they carefully
avoid conversations on cell phones, whenever possible. This implies that the Phone Calls
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network yields a partial reconstruction of the information flow in a Mafia syndicate. A fur-
ther consequence arising from the low propensity of some subjects to make/receive phone
calls is the low degree of overlap between the Phone Calls network and the Meetings net-
work. In practice, criminals prefer alternative means of communication (e.g., they use
intermediaries to convey encrypted messages). Consequently, the Meetings network
includes individuals who had never been intercepted by the police forces. In contrast, some
eavesdropped individuals had no ties with the Mafia syndicate but are acquainted with
some Mafia syndicate members (for instance, because of work, or other family reasons) and
they had conversations with them. Therefore, these individuals have never attended any
meeting and are excluded from the Meetings network.
Conclusions
In this work we have used real-world data relating to a “cosca” that operated in Sicily (Italy)
during the first decade of the 2000s. Specifically, our two datasets were derived from original
juridical acts about two Sicilian clans who sought illegal profits from public procurement pro-
ceedings. The main focus was the social capital analysis, investigated by the drop in the size of
the LCC of the networks.
To facilitate the reproduction and further extension of our work, we have placed an anon-
ymized version of the datasets and the source code in a public repository (https://github.com/
lcucav/criminal-nets/tree/master/disruption) and with citable DOI on Zenodo (https://doi.
org/10.5281/zenodo.3938818), including the Meetings dataset (constructed from police stake-
outs) and the Phone Calls dataset (derived from police wiretaps). We have also derived
weighted and unweighted versions of the datasets.
We have explored mechanisms required for identifying key individuals in the network and,
in turn, speed-up the LCC size drop through minimal node removal. We considered two strat-
egies, namely: (i) a sequential node removal approach, and (ii) block removal. The first one
simulates the scenario in which the police arrest one “cosca” affiliate at a time. The second
one, mimics a police raid. Next, we put to test four different centrality metrics, namely: (i)
Degree centrality, (ii) Betweenness centrality, (iii) Katz centrality, and (iv) Collective Influence.
The effectiveness of the centrality metrics has been validated trough the ρ parameter, which
measures the drop of the LCC size, after node removal, compared with the initial LCC size.
The experiments unveiled Betweenness as the most effective metric. Betweenness produced
a greater impact in terms of LCC size drop rate, thanks to its prioritization of communication
paths, rather than by individual nodes degree. Thus, the resulting optimal strategy was to
order nodes by Betweenness centrality score and to remove the nodes by a decreasing order of
these scores. This procedure tackled directly the communication mechanisms used by criminal
networks, which are designed to minimize the probability of interception by the police.
This work is prone to considerable extensions and adaptations. For one, it would be inter-
esting to conduct a more in-depth comparative study between social and human capital in
Mafia associations. In fact, the resilience of criminal networks also depends on the personal
qualities and competences of their members. In Network Science, those competences are rep-
resented as node labels describing node roles. Therefore, in order to better assess the strength
of a criminal organization, we should also look at the human capital endowment.
While we have looked at how to identify the key information intermediaries, another prom-
ising angle is the identification of individuals holding highly specialized roles. Criminal organi-
zations are increasingly infiltrating highly specialised activities that require very specific
knowledge, skills and competences. For example, pharmacology and chemistry expertise are
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required for synthetic drug manufacturing processes. The removal of these highly specialised
nodes could decisively undermine the resilience of criminal organizations, as such individuals
may be extremely difficult to replace.
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